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cision in City of New York v. Fidelity Trust Co.,7
 holding that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run against the depositor until he has made a
formal demand on the bank for the money. The reasoning of the court was
that if the statute were to run from the date of the forgery or from the date
the bank rendered a statement showing the amount of the check charged to
the depositor's account, it might result in the claim being barred before the
depositor knows of the forgery.
The rule set forth by the Florida court which deviates only in conclu-
sion from that of New York appears to be the better rule because under the
New York view the depositor might withhold demand and perpetuate his
cause of action for an indefinite period. This deficiency of the New York
rule could be avoided by requiring a timely demand by the depositor.
While it is true that the drawer may not know of an invasion of his
legal rights until the forged indorsement is actually discovered, it seems
harsh to hold the drawee bank to strict accountability to the depositor where
the forged indorsement is not discovered in the course of the drawer's busi-
ness. Many years might elapse before the bank is called to account and it
would seem that the bank could be forced to reimburse the drawer although
the drawer's own liability to the payee had been blocked by the statute of
limitations affecting actions on debt. Moreover, the result here makes the
application of the statute a question for the trier of fact in each case, thereby
introducing marked uncertainty into commercial transactions which it would
seem require a high degree of stability especially in view of the tremendous
volume of checks handled by modern banks. Finally, the purpose of the
statute—to cause actions to be commenced within a definite time in order to
facilitate proof of substantive fact questions—is not well served by the
decision.
The UCC resolves this problem by precluding an action against the
bank unless the drawer discovers and reports the forged indorsement within
three years from the time the statement and vouchers are made available to
the drawer.8 This rule was established because it was felt that in the great
preponderance of cases the drawer will discover the forged indorsement
within three years and if in an exceptional case be does not, the balance in
favor of a mechanical termination of liability of the bank outweighs any
possible injustice to the drawer. In a state which has adopted the UCC
both issues of this case would be decided in favor of the drawee bank.
THOMAS DUPONT
Negotiable Instrument—Forged Signature—Recovery by Drawee Bank.
—Riggs Nat'l Bank. of Washington, D.C. v. Dade Fed. Say. and Loan
Assin. 1—The defendant bank received a check in the amount of $20,000
7 243 App. Div. 46, 276 N.Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't 1934) ; see also Bank of British
North America v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 91 N.Y. 106 (1883).
8 UCC § 4-406(4).
1 268 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1959).
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drawn on plaintiff bank enclosed in a letter from one Martucci, requesting
the defendant to cash the check and establish a savings account in his
name; unknown to the defendant, the drawer's signature on the check had
been forged. When the check was received by the defendant, the name
of the payee was blank, which, according to Martucci, was done to facilitate
endorsement. Defendant rubber-stamped its name as payee and endorsed
it "for deposit only" to the newly established account number, although
both Martucci and the drawer of the check were strangers. Plaintiff drawee
honored the check; twelve days later the defendant permitted Martucci
to withdraw $18,000 from the account. After the withdrawal, plaintiff
bank notified the defendant that the drawer's signature was a forgery and
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida to recover the payment. Judgment was entered for the defendant
from which the plaintiff appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, approving the findings of the lower court, held that the
plaintiff could not recover, but remanded for further proceedings on plain-
tiff's claim for $2000 which represented the balance of Martucci's account
with the defendant?
The case presents the issue of whether, upon the acceptance without
question of a check from a stranger with no named payee, the accepting
bank should be made to reimburse the drawee bank which honors such check
without detecting a forgery of the drawer's signature.
The earliest leading case pertaining to the question is Price v. Neal,s
which held that as between equally innocent parties the drawee must suffer
the loss resulting from its failure to detect the forgery of its depositor's
signature. NIL § 62 makes no exception to the liability of the drawee
when a check has been accepted by it under such circumstances. 4 The
UCC, which has been adopted by five states, also makes no allowance for
recovery by a drawee which accepts a check, in those instances where a
holder or collecting bank having no knowledge of the forgery of the drawer's
signature, presents the check for payment. 5 According to the Code, it
would seem that where the drawee's acceptance is obtained without knowl-
edge that the drawer's signature was unauthorized, there is no warranty
as to the genuineness of such signature running from the holder to the
drawee bank. Many American courts have held however, that the NIL in-
corporates the common law rule of Price v. Neal supra, except that the
drawee may recover from the person to whom payment is made on a
showing of the negligence, fraud or bad faith of such person. 6 The
2 The money had been paid into the court registry after the appeal had been
taken and the District Court no longer had jurisdiction.
3 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
4
 NIL § 62: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will
pay according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits-
1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity
and authority to draw the instrument . . ."
5 UCC §§ 3-417, 3-418, 4-207.
6
 First Nat'l Bank of Orleans v. State Bank of Alma, 22 Neb. 769, 36 N.W. 289
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significance of the holder's negligence on the liability of the drawee has
presented some difficulty, however. Such negligence has been found to be
immaterial when it appeared that the drawee was also negligent in making
payment of an instrument on which the drawer's signature had been forged;
the drawee's negligence in such a case has been termed "negligence at law"
or constructive negligence.?
Considering the circumstances under which this sizeable check came
before the defendant, i.e., having no named payee the instrument was
incomplete and it was presented by a stranger through the mail, one might
question whether sufficient precautions were taken to insure that it was
a valid negotiable instrument. However, § 14 of the NIL clearly permits
a holder for value of negotiable paper to fill in the name of the payee, and
there was here the added factor that no funds were paid out by the
defendant Savings and Loan Association until it was notified of the
drawee's acceptance. In addition, the two parties were independent actors,
which formed the basis for the court's adoption of a long established principle
of convenience that a collecting bank need not notify the drawee of the
fact that the space for the payee was blank and that it had made no
check of the identity of the person presenting it. The drawee could have
known from the face of the check itself that the name of the payee had
not been filled in by the drawer. Further, the fact that the defendant did
not check the identity of the person presenting it should have had no
bearing on the plaintiff's care in checking the purported signature of its
depositor. The defendant's presentation of the check did not carry with
it the representation that it had dealt with the drawer personally. So also
it would seem that the defendant did not have a duty to notify the drawee
of the circumstances under which the check was received.
The drawee bank must always be confronted with the fact that it is
presumed to know the signatures of its depositors and it will not be heard
to repudiate its own mistake, when that mistake occasioned the loss of
another, even if want of due care can be shown. The action of the defendant
did not proximately occasion any loss; it was the default of the drawee
which was the direct and immediate cause of the loss because it put the
money beyond the reach of its true owners
The confidence of the public in the stability and negotiability of
commercial paper would be seriously weakened if a drawee bank could
overcome its own mistake and pass on its loss by showing the lack of com-
(1888); First Nat'l Bank of Pukwana v. Brute Nat'l Bank, 41 S.D. 87, 168 N.W. 1054
(1918); Newberry Savings Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 19 S.C. 294, 74 S.E.
615 (1912) ; Citizen's Bank of Fayette v. J. Blach & Sons, Inc., 228 Ala. 246, 153
So. 404 (1934).
7
 First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls v. First Nat'l Bank of Borger, 37 S.W.2d 802
(Tex. Civ. App., 1931).
8 Central Nat'l Bank of Richmond v. First and Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 171 Va.
289, 198 S.E. 883 (1938); Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Rutherford,
115 Tenn. 64, 88 S.W. 939 (1905); Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v.
Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 307 (1929).
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plete care on the part of another, when that other could have prevented the
loss if the drawee had not accepted the instrument. 9
 The transaction, under
the facts in this case, should end with the acceptance of the check by the
drawee; to hold otherwise would leave the way open for the establishment
of contingent liabilities on the part of those who deal with checks prior
to the acceptance of the drawee, and without knowledge of the forgery.
Those situations where money has been paid out before the check is accepted
present a new question and it is possible that a balancing of the loss on a
theory of comparative negligence might be more equitable in such a case.
In the case at hand, however, the drawee should be estopped by its own
action in accepting the check, from asserting that it may reclaim the money
from the defendant even though the latter may not have taken every possible
precaution.
SHEILA M. MCCUE
Negotiable Instruments—Mere Failure to Return a Check Within
Twenty-four Hours as Constituting Acceptance.—Fidelity e..1 Deposit
Co. of Md. v. Idaho Bank FS Trust Co. 1 --Plaintiff, bonding company of for-
warding bank, brought an action in the United States District Court in Idaho
against the defendant drawee bank for losses arising out of a check kiting
operation claiming: (a) that defendant as agent of the forwarding bank was
negligent in the performance of its duties in collecting certain checks for-
warded by plaintiff's assignor and, (b) alternatively, that in failing to return
these checks as dishonored within 24 hours after their receipt, defendant be-
came liable as acceptor thereof under § 27-1006 of the Idaho Code [NIL
§ 137]. On defendant's motion to dismiss, HELD: (1) The counts alleging
negligence in collection stated a cause of action since a drawee bank to which
a collection item has been forwarded direct is a collecting agent of the for-
warding bank as well as a paying agent of the drawer; and (2) the counts
alleging failure of the drawee to return the checks as dishonored within 24
hours after receipt did not state a cause of action since mere retention of
checks does not constitute an acceptance of them.
In accord with the instant case, it is generally held that a drawee bank,
receiving a check for collection from a forwarding bank, acts in the dual
capacity of collecting agent for the forwarder and paying agent for the
drawer? As such, the drawee's duty, as collecting agent, is to present the
checks for acceptance and payment; its duty to the drawer is to pay the
fl Railway Express Agency v. Bank of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 279, 150 So. 525
(1933).
1 173 F. Supp. 70 (D. Idaho 1959).
2 Joffrion-Woods v. Brock, 180 La. 771, 157 So. 589 (1934); Old Motor Works
v. First State Savings Bank of Morend, 258 Mich. 269, 241 N.W. 813 (1932); First
Nat'l Bank of Murfreesboro v. First Nat'l Bank of Nashville, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S.W.
965 (1913).
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